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Section One: Introduction
Bandits, long neglected as a topic of China research, have in the space of
less than 20 years come to be considered among the dominant motifs of
Republican China (19121949). Scholars both in the West and in China have
examined various aspects of republican-period banditry,1) but no systematic at-
tempt has yet been made to explore the reaction of China’s public opinion to
the country’s apparent transformation into what was frequently termed a
“bandit republic”. Since newspapers can be assumed to be reliable indicators
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of the cities, the authors have set out to clarify this point by focusing on the
editorial stand on banditry taken by two of the major independent newspapers
of the period, the Tianjin Dagong bao (大公報), representing north China, and,
for a southern point of view, the Shanghai Shen bao (申報). Here we offer a
preliminary analysis, together with a comprehensive list of banditry-related
editorials from the two papers spanning the years 1912 to 1934.
＊
If bandits had been a perennial presence on the rural Chinese social scene
for centuries past, newspapers figured among the first products of China’s late
19th-century “opening to the West”. Founded in April 1872, the influential
Shen bao was one of China’s earliest newspapers as well as one of the longest
lived, publishing without a break in Shanghai’s Foreign Concession for almost
78 years until the communist “liberation” of the city on May 27, 1949. Over
those years, it faithfully documented the dramatic changes and reflected the
currents of opinion that contributed to the long process of historical change
known as the Chinese revolution.
Established in the Japanese Concession of Tianjin in June 1902, exactly
thirty years after the Shen bao, the Dagong bao came to be perhaps the most
influential independent newspaper of its day. Particularly after September
1926, when it resumed publication after a yearlong hiatus, it sought to live up
to the spirit of its French title L’Impartial by adopting the famous slogan,
“non-partisan, will not sell out, selfless, and clear-sighted” (budang, bumai,
busi, bumang).2) Under the direction of Wu Dingchang, Zhang Jiluan and Hu
Zhengzhi, the revived Dagong bao set out to establish a principle that, as the
country lurched from one crisis to another, would have increasing influence on
Chinese journalism: that of “scholars critiquing politics” (wenren lunzheng).
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Unlike the Shen bao, it continued publication (initially in its old home of
Tianjin, after 1956 in Beijing) following the establishment of the People’s
Republic (PRC), folding shortly after the outbreak of the “Cultural Revolu-
tion” in September 1966. (Its pro-communist Hong Kong edition has contin-
ued to publish until the present day.)
Scholarly research on the Shen bao did not really get under way in China
until the mid- to late 1980s. Because of the great age of the early issues, the
newssheet is yellowed and crumbling, making it difficult to store and even
more difficult to use. Only the Shanghai Municipal Library had anything like
a full run, but in 1982 a decision was taken to have the respected local publish-
ing house Shanghai Shudian begin the work of photocopying, and a complete
set of the Shen bao was finally published five years later in October 1987. This
achievement at last made the paper accessible to scholars, but, while a number
of research articles have been published concerning various aspects of the
paper, to date only one full-length book has appeared.3)
In contrast, a number of research volumes examining various aspects of the
Dagong bao have appeared.4) While the focus was for a long time on its post
1926 reincarnation, the most recent work, Hou Jie’s Dagong bao yu jindai
Zhongguo shehui, throws light on the paper’s tortuous early years, particularly
the years from 1902 to 1916.5) Following its establishment in 1902 by the re-
form-minded Manchu Catholic Ying Lianzhi, the paper struggled until, in 1916,
it was sold to a Tianjin businessman-turned-politician closely allied to the war-
lord grouping known as the Anhui Clique (Anfuxi junfa), Wang Zhilong. After
that, though marginally more successful, it inevitably came to be regarded as
representing the views of the Clique’s civilian arm, the pro-Japanese Anfu
Club (Anfu julebu) allied to Premier Duan Qirui.6) This hardly “impartial”
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period lasted no more than four years, however. Popular anger at Japan’s “21
Demands” and post-World War I designs on Shandong saw readers abandon
the paper in droves, sending it to the nadir of its popularity. Finally, following
defeat in the Zhili-Anhui war of July 1920, the Anhui Clique lost its control
over Parliament, and a month later the paper’s editors announced their inde-
pendence of the Anfu Club. In September 1923, Wang Zhilong, who had cut his
ties with the paper and fled to Japan following the 1920 debacle, was killed in
the Great Kanto Earthquake. By this time, circulation had plummeted to
around 100 copies per issue, and in 1925 the paper finally went into voluntary
liquidation. It was revived in the following year, as noted above, with a new
mission that committed it to taking a more critical political stand.7)
By the mid1920s, largely because of the self-centred machinations of and
repeated conflicts between warlord cliques like those of Zhili and Anhui, ban-
dits had become a major problem throughout rural China. Holding foreigners
for ransom as a means of gaining respectability through admission to the army
became a popular bandit strategy, and the warlords, always in the market for
new recruits, generally connived at the practice. By the late 1920s and early
1930s, beyond the immediate vicinity of the cities, there was hardly a district
in the country that was not affected by bandits, a situation that became ever
more dire as the years went by. With a central government seemingly incapa-
ble of doing much beyond providing a rich prize for the various political rivals
jockeying for power, China teetered on the brink of foreign intervention, and
more than once the catalyst for interventionist threats was the latest bandit
“outrage”.8)
For Chinese intellectuals, meanwhile, the world was a very different place
from the one they had inhabited until the end of the old examination system
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only a score or so years before. Instead of waiting to be called upon to serve
as scholars, they were free to pursue independent careers. Amid the
revolutionary currents that swept the country from the end of the 19th century
onwards, particularly after the May 4th Movement of 1919, study ceased to be
a means of attaining bureaucratic office and became an end in itself, something
to be practically applied for the sake of rescuing the nation ( jiuguo). Alienated
from a state apparatus that seemed bent on subverting rather than sustaining
national identity, taught either by the newly-established Western schools or
through their experiences while studying abroad to believe in the paramount
nature of independent thought, many early 20th-century Chinese intellectuals
found a mission in the role of independent political observer, for but not of the
nation-state, offering their insights gratis to whoever was able to put them to
use for the purpose of safeguarding the nation’s future.9) Journalism became for
many the natural means of putting their knowledge at the service of the nation.
Particularly following the New Culture Movement of the early 1920s, which
called for the educated elite to become more strongly engaged with the critical
social, political and cultural issues of the day, a trend towards more compre-
hensive coverage of “social news” ( shehui xinwen) became increasingly no-
ticeable. It was only a matter of time before such concerns translated
themselves into a “mechanism for building a sense of national belonging”.10)
How did these concerned Chinese intellectuals feel about the rampant ban-
ditry that they were reading about more and more frequently in the columns
of their daily newspaper? How aware were they of what was happening, and
how did they react? To what extent did they feel responsible for guiding the
country out of the abyss? Were they in tune with successive governments’ at-
tempts to stem the tide of lawlessness, or did they feel that different methods
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were required? These are some of the questions that the authors’ research
will attempt to answer by focusing on the two newspapers described above.
Research on bandits hitherto, including that of the present authors, has made
frequent use of newspapers, but only as a source of raw information on “ban-
dit incidents” and so on. The stance of the papers themselves, and the impli-
cations of that stance, have been ignored ; this paper thus seeks to help fill a
research gap, not only with regard to bandits, but also with regard to modern
Chinese newspapers’ social position.
＊
If reportage is the stuff on which a newspaper depends, the primary reason
for its being, its editorials constitute its soul, the banner by which it proclaims
its stance to the world. Focusing on representative incidents in the world at
large, or on issues significant to the broad mass of people, editorials signify the
attitude of the paper’s editors to the issue at hand. Simultaneously reflecting
and forming public opinion at large, newspaper editorials, which vividly ex-
press the interplay between thought and society, can play a major role in influ-
encing both the conceptions and the actions of their readers. The Shen bao and
the Dagong bao were particularly energetic in this respect, above all with re-
gard to banditry as it progressively became one of the country’s most pressing
social issues. Hardly a day went by without their carrying a report of the latest
bandit incident, and their editorials, often lengthy and painstakingly composed,
were aptly timed to interact with and give shape to the public’s reaction to
what they were reading. True, the writers’ vantage point in the cities set them
apart from the mass of people who were suffering from the activities of rural
bandits, forcing them to adopt the standpoint of onlookers. Yet their observa-
tions, and the critiques they developed as a result, were at least rooted in the
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same historical time-space conditions that those readers inhabited, putting
them much closer to events on the ground than scholars of a later era, who are
obliged to rely on what Timothy Garton Ash has called the “illusions of retro-
spective determinism”.11)
Despite their importance, the role of these social commentators has been
overlooked by researchers almost as completely as that of bandits had been
until a decade or two ago. A study of editorial writers’ critiques of Republican
China’s bandit problem, while throwing the bandit problem itself into clearer
historical perspective, can at the same time permit a more direct insight into
the concerns of China’s popular media, and simultaneously bring to life the
unique cultural standpoint, political views, and social role of early 20th-century
China’s newspapermen.
＊
Both the Shen bao and the Dagong bao offered their readers real-time cover-
age of the country’s escalating bandit problem. As well as providing a wealth
of on-the-spot reporting, they each offered their own perspective on the
causes of the problem, rooted in a non-partisan viewpoint independent of the
various political centres, to which bandits were frequently no more than either
a stick to beat their rivals or else a means of enhancing their own relative
strength. The two papers’ editorial pages also provided a forum for their read-
ership to debate and offer their own suggestions as to the best means of solv-
ing the bandit problem. From the government’s point of view, such proposals
offered not only a font of information as to the state of public opinion, but also
a free source of practical ideas concerning the best means of bringing the ban-
dit problem under control.
Editorials in the two papers also offered a vivid example of how the new
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mission felt by 20th century Chinese intellectuals, referred to earlier in this ar-
ticle, frequently became the driving force of the newspapers they founded or
worked for. Alongside the spirit of “scholars critiquing politics”, these writers
showed their firm determination to function as responsible members of the
newly-born civil society of Republican China. Not only a fierce nationalism but
also a strong sense of social responsibility, founded in the belief that “each of
us has a stake in our nation’s survival” ( tianxia xingwang, pifu youze), under-
lie the argument of most of the editorials, demonstrated in the numerous pro-
posals and plans of action for solving the bandit problem that they offered. In
their analysis of the roots of the bandit problem as well of the methods re-
quired to solve it, the two papers showed a remarkable unanimity, demonstrat-
ing how close each of them was to the dominant trends of public opinion in the
country. Although Republican China had seen the appearance of numerous
journals and newspapers, each offering its own take on the nation’s needs, and
the Dagong bao and Shen bao could not claim to represent the feelings of the
entire country, the popularity of the two papers, along with the general con-
sensus in their editorials, suggests that they were highly representative of
public opinion in early 20th-century China.
For all that they concurred on the basic issues, however, the two papers also
showed numerous contrasts, resulting from a number of factors including their
geographical location, their operating methods and ultimate objectives, the
personality and political stance of their main editors, and so on.
Concerning location, for example, the area that loomed largest for the
Tianjin-based Dagong bao was the region surrounding the capital Beijing─
Zhili, northern Shandong, Henan, etc. ─while the Shanghai Shen bao was
likely to pick up on significant bandit incidents wherever they occurred.
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Whereas the May 1923 Lincheng Incident, perhaps the most notorious of all
bandit “outrages” in Republican China because of the large number of foreign
captives, merited only six editorial mentions in the Dagong bao, the Shen bao
expressed its position on the Incident, in which an express train was derailed
in southern Shandong, on some twenty-odd occasions. In direct contrast, the
notorious chief Liu Guitang, whose gang terrorized several north China prov-
inces during the 1930s, is conspicuous by his absence in the Shen bao but was
deemed significant enough in north China to warrant a dozen or more editori-
als in the Dagong bao.
Not surprisingly, differences in emphasis could also be found between the
two papers ; again, the Lincheng Incident offered an apt example. Whereas the
Shen bao laid the blame for the incident on corruption within the Zhili Clique-
dominated Beiyang Government and offered a number of stinging criticisms of
the government, the Dagong bao avoided the question of governmental respon-
sibility altogether, and there is no suggestion anywhere in its analyses of the
issue that the government could have done something either to prevent the in-
cident or to resolve it more quickly than it did. Whether the government was
exerting behind-the-scenes pressure on the Dagong bao’s editors, whether the
paper’s proprietors were just seeking not to offend, or whether the Shen bao’s
bold stance was simply a case of “the mountains are high and the emperor is
far off”, the contrast between the two papers’ attitudes was clear. In contrast,
while the Bai Lang rebellion of 19131914, which affected several provinces
across the breadth of north China, provoked more than fifty editorials in the
Dagong bao, showing the seriousness with which local opinion viewed the re-
bellion, the Shen bao, perhaps reflecting the lack of concern in the unaffected
provinces of central China, expressed its opinion on the rebellion only eight
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times. The 1923 Lincheng Incident assumed much larger proportions for the
paper than did Bai Lang, partly because the train had originally set out from
Shanghai, but also because of the city’s strong sense of identity as an
international metropolis.
As a final example, while they were agreed on the need for urgent measures
to tackle the bandit problem so as to stabilize the nation, the two papers
tended to emphasize different solutions. Their approaches to the four-
province (Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, Shandong) border area in north China, a
focus of bandit operations for centuries because of the ease with which a gang
could escape over one or other of the provincial borders, was a case in point.
Whereas the Shen bao came out more often in favour of creating a new admin-
istrative framework by redrawing the boundary lines to eliminate the border
problem altogether, such a proposal was shunned by the Dagong bao, which
preferred joint efforts by the various provincial authorities to eliminate the
bandits (a suggestion which, in turn, was quite absent from the pages of the
Shen bao.)
In the last analysis, however enthusiastically presented, however necessary,
however well intentioned, and however well thought out they may have been,
the proposals of the two papers for putting an end to China’s banditry problem
foundered on the twin rocks that dashed every other effort to transform the
country into a modern nation state. With constant military clashes between
rival warlords each seeking to carve out a part of the country as their own ter-
ritory, and with various kinds of social upheaval rocking the country so inces-
santly, proposals that may have seemed highly rational and supremely feasible
on paper became no more than wishful thinking. Only a total political transfor-
mation that eliminated the competing centres altogether could have brought
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about the effect these intellectuals desired, a fact that is brought out by the
failure of all attempts to eliminate banditry until the advent of a government in
1949 that was as efficient as it was ruthless. The dawning of such a realization
would mark the birth of revolutionary consciousness in 20th-century China, but
the authors of the Shen bao’s and Dagong bao’s editorials were seeking no
more than to reflect their readers’ desire for a more stable and more rational
status quo. To that extent, we can at least confirm their strong concern for
what was happening to their country, along with their passionate identification
with the pains and anxieties of their readership.
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Section Two: Banditry-Related Editorials from the
and 	
Note
The Dagong bao’s editorials appeared under various rubrics, but most com-
monly came under the headings of “Opinion” ( yanlun言論), “Idle Notes”
(xianping 閑評 ), “Commentary on Current Events” ( shiping 時評 ),
“Commentary” ( lunping論評), “Editorial” ( sheping社評), “Short Commen-
tary” (duanping短評), and so on. Although some carried either the name or
the pen name of the writer, most were unaccredited. It will be seen that in
many cases columns, particularly the “Idle Notes” (xianping) columns, car-
ried no subtitle to indicate their content ; readers were obliged to read the edi-
torial to determine its subject matter. Rather than describe the explicit
content of each untitled column, we have simply listed the dates of those
which relate to bandits, and leave interested scholars to explore further.
As for the Shen bao, “Commentary on Current Events” ( shiping), “Discus-
sion” (pinglun 評論), “Special Column” ( zhuanlun 専論), “Miscellaneous
Notes” ( zalu 雑録), “Topical Essay” ( shilun 時論), “Esteemed Essays by
Contemporary Figures” ( shiren minglun 時人名論), “Miscellaneous Com-
mentary” ( zaping 雑評), and “Unfettered Discussion” ( ziyoutan 自由談)
were the titles most commonly given to expression of the paper’s editorial
stance. Most of the essays were signed, only a few of them being credited to
the Shen bao itself. Unlike the case of the Dagong bao, all of the editorials car-
ried at least a rudimentary title indicating their content.
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*丁義華 (Ding Yihua) was the Chinese name used by the American
Presbyterian missionary Edward W. Thwing (1868??). Thwing arrived in
China as a young man in 1887 and began working as an evangelist at the
Canton Christian College, later entering the newspaper world. After the 1911
Revolution he took up the task of opium prohibition, and was elected to the
post of General Secretary at Peking of the International Reform Bureau, a
Protestant missionary organization dedicated to the prohibition of alcohol as
well as narcotics. Thwing’s written works included The Opium Question and
the Present Movement（1911).
**冷 (Leng Guan) was the pen-name of Hu Lin (胡霖), aka. Hu Zhengzhi
(胡政之 ; 18891949), manager and co-editor of the Dagong bao, as described
above, and also an influential figure in early-twentieth century Chinese poli-
tics.
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Both Western and Chinese scholars have examined various aspects of re-
publican-period Chinese banditry, but no systematic attempt has been made to
explore the reaction of China’s public opinion to the country’s descent to the
state of “bandit republic”. Since newspapers can usually be taken as reliable
indicators of the state of public opinion, at least among the educated population
of the cities, the authors focus on the editorial stand on banditry taken by two
of China’s major independent newspapers, the Tianjin Dagong bao (大公報)
and the Shanghai Shen bao (申報).
The present article is a preliminary analysis, together with a comprehensive
list of banditry-related editorials from the two papers spanning the years 1912
to 1934. It finds that, while both papers took a serious view of the problem,
and increasingly assumed the role of independent adviser to the government
on “bandit-suppression”, their focus and the solutions they offered tended to
differ as a result of things like geographical location and their proximity to po-
litical centres. The article also finds that the birth of social consciousness in
Chinese journalism was a reflection of the transformation of Chinese intellec-
tuals following the abolishment of the old examination system, which allowed
them for the first time to take up a position of “scholars critiquing politics”.
In the end, however, all the proposals offered by the two papers for putting
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an end to China’s bandit problem foundered as did every other effort to trans-
form the country into a modern state. With various kinds of social and political
upheaval rocking the country incessantly throughout the years of the Republic,
the most rational and ostensibly practical proposals became no more than
wishful thinking until the advent in 1949 of a new central government that was
as efficient as it was ruthless.
